This essay assesses biological naturalism, a material monist theory of mind. It was proposed by John Searle in the 1980s and proposes that conscious states can be reduced to natural brain processes.

In answering this question we must first recognise that it assumes the existence of conscious states. This means that we cannot answer the question from the point of view of theories such as eliminative materialism that deny the existence of consciousness.

The point of view that would be most associated with the question is that of biological naturalism, which asserts that conscious states are natural processes and functions of the brain.

John Searle proposed biological naturalism in the 1980s. The theory is a materialist account of mind in that it defines the mind as a physical entity, and a reductive theory in that conscious states are reduced to natural brain processes. Essentially the theory is opposite to computational accounts of mind such as functionalism. It maintains that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain; a natural, organic function that cannot be explained in purely functional terms.

Searle's own illustration of his theory is that the liver secretes bile, the heart pumps blood, the lungs oxygenate and so on and so forth. In this way he demonstrates that each organ in the body has a natural function and a role to play in the organism. Thus, argues Searle, surely the same can be said of the brain? In answer to the question 'what is the brain's purpose?' he proposes that its sole function is to provide consciousness.

This theory has its roots, at least to a certain extent, in Searle's opposition not only to computational accounts of mind, but their implication that artificial consciousness is possible. The theory can be seen as a return to nature and observation of 'what is' in contrast with the apparent harshness of materialist theories that see the human mind as another computer or machine to explain. Searle is certainly not anti-science: the historical context of this theory allows for an aspect of backlash against preceding accounts of mind. As with other philosophers of the time such as Davidson, Searle also wanted to preserve consciousness without resorting to a dualist account to do so.

Having looked at the content and context of the theory, let us now examine the responses for and against the theory.

Firstly, the theory has an immediately intuitive appeal because it preserves consciousness, which in turn allows for the apparent difference in our perceptions of conscious and physical states.

Secondly, the theory is naturalistic. It would seem absurd to suggest that the brain had no purpose or that consciousness was not a natural phenomenon. In being naturalistic, the theory is also appropriate to the subject matter; it does not attempt to apply concepts from other disciplines to the mind (as in computational accounts).

Consciousness can also be explained as an evolutionary process. Awareness of the environment is a clear advantage to a species. This awareness can naturally lead to curiosity about the world and thence to oneself. Thus, not only can we see that an organism might develop self-awareness, but also that this development would confer additional evolutionary advantages. A self-aware species would be more adaptable, flexible and sophisticated. We can even see the development of intelligence and awareness in the historical and fossil records. This is a significant strength of the theory; it not only attains a scientific basis, but also acknowledges that consciousness is an inevitable consequence of evolution, thus establishing a natural origin of consciousness.

In describing the mind in this way Searle has obviously side-stepped the issues surrounding dualism. However, this could be said of any monist theory. A more significant advantage is that, if correct, he has avoided the pitfalls of attributing consciousness to obviously non-sentient objects such as computers that dogged behaviourism and functionalism.

Finally, the theory allows for the first person perspective. As conscious states are emergent, natural properties of the brain it seems logical that these states would allow the person experiencing those states some level of privilege not enjoyed by others who can merely observe those states.

However, there are also responses that attack the theory or point to flaws. A simple argument with the detail of the theory might be that if consciousness is a function of the brain, what then could be said to be conscious? Where is the line drawn? Is a dog conscious? Perhaps a fish or a bacterium could be conscious? At what point in development is a human being conscious? Either the theory needs to deny the consciousness of other species and lay itself open to charges of chauvinism, or it needs to draw a line beyond which consciousness is not admitted of, which is also problematic.

Another objection is that the theory is in some way ad hoc. This is because in response to a request for justification of why the account works the naturalist can simply say this is the way in which we find things and that there is no need to explain why this is the case or how the brain does it. The theory, according to the naturalist, is simply a description of how things are. This attack is known as the naturalist fallacy.

far more significant objection is that comparison of consciousness with other organ functions (as in Searle's example the heart or lungs) is not a fair comparison. This is because consciousness is obviously many magnitudes more complex than the function of pumping blood, or anything else that the body does. In comparison, even the most advanced interactions of the body such as cell division or the reproductive process are simple compared to self-awareness and conscious thought. This attacks the fundamental principle of biological naturalism, and is thus a damaging objection.

A further significant objection is that alternative functions for the brain can be posited that do not require or invoke consciousness. Might it not be reasonable to suggest that the natural function of the brain is to regulate other bodily functions? This is a powerful objection for two reasons. Firstly, it uses naturalism to refute itself by arguing that the natural function of the brain is something other than consciousness (simultaneously avoiding the charge of consciousness being more complex than other organ functions). Secondly, this account acknowledges that the brain performs many functions that are clearly not linked to consciousness (such as basic regulation of bodily processes and stimulus-response motor control). Searle asserts that the only function of the brain is consciousness, whereas it has been clearly proved that consciousness is not necessarily lost upon brain damage and that indeed other functions may be affected instead. This empirical evidence strongly supports the case that consciousness is not the only function of the brain.

Thus, in conclusion to this assessment of the view that conscious states are natural process of brain states we can say that the theory makes an intuitively compelling argument. However, on closer examination we can see two key flaws in the argument: the failure to explain the complexity of consciousness and the ability to provide an alternative naturalist explanation that does not involve consciousness. These objections lead us to the conclusion that biological naturalism does not provide a complete account of mind.

Tutor: Oliver McAdoo MA

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