The bundle theory of ontology asserts that objects are a bundle of their properties. The object itself therefore cannot exist separately from its properties; the object is its collected properties. When we examine how Hume constructs bundle theory relating to the mind we see a similar logic. Hume asserts that the individual is a product of their thoughts, experiences, etc. However when he attempts to introspect the nature of the self that owns and feels these experiences he comes up empty handed. Not a little reluctantly he thus concludes that there is no 'I' or owner of these experiences, just a set of experiences related by "resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect".

Thus, objects don't exist: there are only bundles of properties and identities don't exist: there are only bundles of experiences. The fact that we assume that there must be something that unifies these bundles is not borne out in practice according to Hume.

The origins of bundle theory can be seen in the above link to consideration of the ontology of objects. In addition, it can also be seen in context of responding to objections raised against physical and psychological continuity. Lastly, Hume arrived at the theory after a period of introspection where he expected to find the 'I' that experienced. When he could not elicit this he felt forced into this position.

In arguing for a bundle theory of the self we can point to the inevitability that Hume felt. If we were to repeat Hume's introspection in an attempt to find the self we would also fail. This is because we can only bring to mind thoughts and ideas based on experiences. As we have no experience of the 'I' that owns these experiences, only the experiences themselves we are forced (as Hume was) into the position that the self does not exist.

This highlights and reinforces the primacy of the mental over the physical as even in denying the existence of the self, it is the mind that defines the bundle that is 'us'. Hume achieves this whilst simultaneously avoiding substance dualism to explain this primacy.

Furthermore bundle theory avoids the significant problems posed by the physical and psychological arguments for continuity of the self (discussed later). In denying the self there is thus no issue to be faced as far as continuity is concerned.

However, for all it's simplicity and force there are an impressive array of responses and arguments against the theory.

Firstly we can argue that the argument is ad hoc in that it simply denies the problem by denying identity. The bundle of experiences that he talks of will be present even if other theories of identity are correct (for example, psychological or physical continuity) because we all store experiences as memories. Thus, surely we are entitled to ask what alternative is it that Hume is really proposing in place of identity?

Secondly, if the bundle is a collection of mental events and experiences, what is it that collects the collection? In the same way that properties must be of something experiences must have been experienced by something; neither have existence in their own right, but are subvenient on an entity that exists in space and time.

There is also an issue of degree: what level of experience is required to make one a person? If you are nothing more than a bundle of experiences then how can we differentiate between an infant with little experience and an adult with a wealth of experience. A further point along these lines asks what if two people have identical perceptions, are they then the same person? It seems absurd to propose such a thing.

A further attack on bundle theory is a reductio ad absurdum - taking the theory to its absurd logical conclusion. If all our thoughts and experiences are atomistic mental events, unrelated to the self or other events not caused by them, then bundle theory is itself in this class; thus, if the theory is correct it is self refuting.

By asserting that the 'I' does not exist and that we are just a bundle or experiences, Hume also rejects certain models of mind. A material monist model of mind would imply a physical model of continuity, as even the bundle of experiences would be physical and public. Not only is this problematic in itself, but also in constructing people as bundles of subjective experiences then their position seems inevitably solipsistic.

Indeed any theory of continuity that allows for identity offers a significant argument against bundle theory. We could argue for ongoing identity by continuity of the physical form. However, physical continuity as a theory does not allow for physical regeneration and changes over time (for example a cell death and replacement). In its place we might consider psychological continuity, which argues that we are the same person we once were because we remember being so. However, Russell demolishes this argument by asking how we might know that we were not created five minutes ago with implanted memories. Bundle theory side steps both of these issues by rejecting identity as a whole, but in rejecting identity does Hume not also reject continuity?

Another classic issue for theories of identity is that of teleportation. Teleportation, according to Parfit, "is a procedure by which your body is destroyed in one location, whereas all relevant information is transmitted to a new location where the body is reconstructed from different particles". This obviously has big implications for continuity theorists because although the person who has arrived at the other end will be physically identical with the same memories, there is no continuity with the old self, which has been, to all intents and purposes, killed. By following Hume's theory, teleportation provides no issues, which is a serious worry, because even if we could create an essentially identical person via teleportation, the existence of such an identical twin would not make your death any less tragic for you!

As users of language, we can only 'connect' to the outside world by abstracting from experience - we do not experience the chair direct but the internal mental experience of the chair (excepting the realist view of epistemology). Hence it is this perception that we analyse when we introspect, it is merely our limitation that cannot analyse the true reality. Thus, our experience of identity is identity and the fact that we cannot introspect it directly does not meant that it does not exist. This point is related to the objection of Kant, below.

In order to understand Kant's objection to bundle theory we must briefly examine his ideas on metaphysics. Kant saw two 'worlds' operating: the world of appearances and properties that we perceive (the world of phenomenon), and the world of things as they are in themselves, as their essences (the world of noumenon) that we cannot perceive. Thus he argued that there would be both a phenomenal self that we could perceive as well as a noumenal self that would remain unknown to us. The fact that Hume could not perceive the 'I' thus did not mean that it did not exist: it was just noumenal.

Finally we should ask how ask how we might differentiate between people in Hume's world? If there is no identity, then how can we differentiate between other people and ourselves? If we cannot differentiate between others and ourselves then conversation, rationality, in fact understanding at all would be impossible! The fact that cognition works at all serves to deny Hume's theory. Thus, if we are to understand Hume's theory we are also to deny its possibility, making it self-refuting.

Thus, in conclusion to this assessment of the view that there is no such thing as identity we can say that there is an overwhelming weight of objection to it. Two of these objections point to the theory as self-refuting and as such it must be rejected as conclusively refuted. Given the problems with the physical and psychological continuity arguments of identity we could argue for functionalism as this allows for memories, but only as a product of a continuing physical system. Further, it acknowledges that inner states are an essential part of the conscious system. Thus, by allowing for physical and psychological states in tandem with each other, functionalism could explain identity whilst avoiding the issues associated with the physical and psychological continuity arguments of identity.



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