This essay assesses eliminative materialism, a material monist theory of mind proposed by Paul and Patricia Churchland in the 1960s. The basic tenant of the theory is that consciousness does not exist and talk of it is merely 'folk psychology'

The view that consciousness can be entirely dispensed with is associated with a theory called eliminative materialism. Paul and Patricia Churchland proposed eliminative materialism or eliminativism in the 1960s. As with all materialist theories it supposes that all phenomena are physical (in contrast to substance dualism and idealist monism).

The Churchlands dismissed consciousness as 'folk psychology'; describing it as simply a term ascribed to a phenomenon that couldn't be understood, in much the same way as ancient peoples ascribed spirits to things that they couldn't understand. They argued that the only way to understand anything is via a physical description and that consciousness clearly could not be captured in such terms.

Thus the conclusion is simply that what we call consciousness does not exist and is hence eliminated. Our concepts of mental states can be re-framed in terms of a physical neurological description and the advancement of science will make talk of mental states obsolete by fully understanding the physical processes that cause our perceptions of mental states.

The Churchlands were not only concerned with providing a description of the mind that eliminated consciousness to the philosophical community, but they were also concerned with removing mental language from vocabulary. Essentially they argued that natural language was a poor model for what goes on inside the head because it used semantics (i.e. meaning) and syntax (i.e. structure).

They proposed 'new language'. New language would use scientific understanding of the structure of the brain to allow a much more powerful language for deeper communication and thus replace the concepts of beliefs, consciousness, etc. This can be compared with the old talk of alchemical essences being replaced with talk of chemical elements following the discoveries of science.

The problem with common language is that the use of semantics (i.e. meaning or interpretation of a word) implies (or exists as a result of) folk psychology. The Churchlands argue that it is inaccurate and misleading to talk of the mind in a scientific sense using semantic classifications the; semantics are essentially not scientific. The way in which new language should be constructed is using the same rules as science itself. Scientific investigation of the brain will reveal the standard rules of cause and effect at work, the Churchlands believe. Thus, as the mind follows a set of rules in a known structure so should language and thus new language should be syntactic (i.e. a systematic arrangement) and not semantic.

A commonly used illustration of this set of concepts is to compare our talk of consciousness and mental states to talk of gods by the ancient Greeks. In a similar way the ancient Greeks had a semantic classification of phenomena that was not rooted in scientific examination of the phenomena.

It was the scientific investigation of the physical phenomena in the brain that can be argued to have lead to the development of eliminativism. At the time scientific progress was very fast in some fields; many serious questions had been answered and chemistry, physics, and biology seemed to be nearing a conclusion with regards to understanding life. The advancing fields of neuroscience, linguistics, computers and cybernetics all combined to make consideration of consciousness as much a scientific field as a philosophic one for the first time.

Another key driver for the development of the theory was the march of progress in philosophy: previous materialist theories had been posited in response to dualism and idealist monism, and eliminative materialism provided a response to the problems of reductive materialist theories. Essentially, reducing consciousness to a purely physical form was the source of many objections to reductive materialist theories, by simply eliminating consciousness these were thus solved.

Having now examined the content and context of the theory let us now turn to the responses for and against the theory.

A significant plus point is that the theory has scientific roots, basing the theory more in fact than abstraction or assumption. This also allows for the theory to be empirically verified.

Eliminativism not only describes the process of the mind as purely physical, but also rejects the notion of any other non-reductive explanations. This will allow for the direct observation of other peoples mind processes, thus solving the issue of other minds.

By responding to reductive materialist theories of the mind, eliminativism can also be said to respond to the problems of dualism, idealist monism, etc although it should be noted that it does this by default as all materialist theories respond to these theories.

The critical plus point is that eliminativism responds to reductive materialist accounts of the mind. Reductionist theories share a common problem in struggling to explain how consciousness might emerge from a purely physical system or how any explanation of consciousness can be reduced to physical terms. Eliminativism solves this by simply doing away with consciousness - declaring it an error and attempting to consign it to the linguistic dustbin along with other superseded terms.

However, the theory also has its detractors (aside from offending many psychologists!). The 'common-sense' reaction is that the theory does not capture what the mind is; it has not explained the experienced phenomena even if it has explained some observed phenomena.

As with other materialist accounts of the mind the reliance on the purely physical implies determinism and thus attacks free will, intentional action, etc. In addition, in asserting that everything is physical the theory denies the existence of anything that cannot be explained purely in physical terms. An example of this might be a concept. The idea of cause and effect has no existence; it is simply a concept held in people's minds. Perhaps in this way eliminativism itself might inadvertently deny its own existence?

Another attack arises from this point. Eliminativism solves the problem of other minds by essentially denying the existence of minds. This is because eliminativism does not simply explain mental states in terms of physical states, but denies that mental states exist at all and seeks to remove all talk of them from our language. This approach is ad hoc in that it doesn't answer the problem; it simply denies the problem. If this approach worked, I could solve the problem of my student loans by simply declaring all loans are 'folk debt'.

Thomas Nagel proposed a further objection by asking what it would be like to be a bat. Essentially his argument is not dissimilar to Frank Jackson's 'What Fred knew and Mary didn't' arguments, and like Jackson, Nagel's argument can be used to counter all materialist theories. However, it is most commonly associated with eliminativism because it was created in response to that theory.

Nagel's argument is that a bat has a significantly different ontology from that of a human being. Next he assumes that only physical processes exist and that there is no difference between consciousness and the physical brain (as in eliminativism). Thus, Nagel argues, it logically follows that observing an experience and observing a physical brain process are one and the same thing. This then follows that if we physically examine a bat in sufficient detail that we could then experience the world as a bat does. Nagel proposes that this is patently absurd and as a result the argument of eliminativism fails.

The final argument against eliminativism brings us back to a discussion of language again. John Searle proposed the 'Chinese room' thought experiment as a counter argument to eliminative materialism and artificial intelligence in general. His driving themes are that brains cause minds (brains are not minds in themselves) and that syntax is not a replacement for semantics.

In the experiment a person who neither knows nor understands any Chinese is placed in a room with a large volume of Chinese symbols on cards and a set of rules for match one set of symbols with another. These rules are purely syntactical because the person has no comprehension of the meaning of the symbols.

Someone outside the room writes questions in Chinese on cards and delivers them into the room. The person inside then matches the symbols using the rules and 'replies' with another set of cards. Although the answer might seem reasonable to the person outside the room we can see that there is no actual thinking taking place, merely the following of rules. The Chinese room is obviously a metaphor for a computer. Computers also run solely on syntax and the manipulation of symbols without ever having any concept of meaning (sematics).

Thus Searle concludes that eliminativism fails as a description of the mind because a purely syntactical approach prevents intentional and meaningful human states.

Therefore in conclusion to this review of the view that consciousness can be dispensed with entirely we can say that although the argument is compelling and based in science, empirical analysis has not yet proved its truth. Furthermore, eliminativism fails to answer a key attack on materialism, that of the apparent impossibility of making experience public from observation of internal physical processes. The argument is most certainly useful in advancing our understanding of the philosophy of mind, but fails to answer the central question of what is consciousness.

1. Ramsey, William, "Eliminative Materialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
2. Dictionary of the philosophy of Mind - Chris Eliasmith (ed)
3. Chris Eliasmith - Philosophy of mind course notes University of Waterloo CA
4. www.dictionary.com
5. Philosophy of cognitive science course notes - Dr. Ron Mallon of the University of Hong Kong
6. Thomas Nagel Faculty Home page
7. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy entry for Chinese room by Larry Hauser

Tutor: Oliver McAdoo MA

WWW www.arrod.co.uk