This question identifies the ancient philosophic problem of reconciling free will and causality. If effect follows cause, then surely our actions are also determined and we cannot be held responsible for our actions? However, we feel free and have moral identities within society. The two ideas are seemingly incompatible.

In order to understand Hume's contribution, we will analyse his position and also examine it from the point of view of Kant. Kant built on Hume's work and developed his own thoughts concerning causality and liberty. Despite their differences we shall see that the two accounts are very similar.

Enlightenment

Hume was an enlightenment philosopher. The enlightenment was a period in European history (18th Century) when many developments converged leading to revolutionary change. The story of the enlightenment is one of increasing freedoms that laid the foundations of modern western society.

The key change was in the political and intellectual authority of the church. In medieval times the church had supreme authority, however, this was diluted by the ascendancy of Protestantism. As the source of dogma was the church, reduced religious power led in turn to a greater freedom of thought as well as a wider loss of faith in traditional sources of authority. Thus intellectual enquiry took off as scepticism and doubt replaced dogma and acceptance. The enlightenment was radically free both in the thoughts expressed and in the areas covered.

This was the birth of the scientific method. It was understood that the method by which the world was examined was as important as 'facts' about it. As Lessing said "The real power of reason lies not in the possession of truth, but in the acquisition of truth".

There were also a panoply of developments in science, technology and society that contributed to the ferment of the enlightenment. The chief contribution of these was to make philosophy and ideas the concern of more and more people. Indeed some Dutch merchants became rich from distributing books banned in other countries.

However, the new intellectual freedoms were not without constraint. The new tradition of scepticism provided an environment whereby ideas were honed by constant attack and modification - the classic scientific peer review system was beginning.

Whilst the scientific approach of observing the universe to make conjectures and generalisations was significant and did debunk some old-world ideas (e.g. the motion of the planets), the real impact was the use of radical scepticism to reason and argue the facts in an attempt to prove what is known. This is the context within which Hume developed his ideas and his rigorously empirical approach: to apply the scientific method to philosophy.

Hume (1711-76) worked towards the end of the wider European enlightenment and was a central figure in the Scottish enlightenment (1740-1800). There were many links between Scottish thinkers both across disciplines and with the European movement in France. This interdisciplinary approach gave the Scottish enlightenment a great practicality. This can be seen in Hume's approach: "let your science be human and as such have a direct reference to action and society" (Enquiries: 4).

Hume rejected traditional metaphysics and the rationalism of the early enlightenment. He denied the concept of innate ideas and even the foundationalist method itself. Instead he favoured the tabula rasa approach and sought to understand the human mind scientifically - the subtitle to his Treatise was 'an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects'.

In this approach Hume is arguably one of the first modern philosophers because of his rejection of religious, dogmatic or mythical explanations in favour of the scientific method. More than this, Hume is ahead of his time by introducing the kernels of the post-modernist ideas of constructs and personal perspectives constraining the perceptions and freedom of the individual.

Analysis of Humean Philosophy

The problem of free will is the problem of reconciling determinism and freedom to make sense of morality. In order to understand Hume's contribution to the problem, we need to understand his view of cause and effect and how that relates to human freedom of action. In turn, Hume's conclusions concerning cause and effect have their basis in his epistemology and his wider philosophical approach.

Hume's approach to his philosophy is as a scientist to his experiment: "a cautious observation of human life …men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures" (Treatise: xix). Hume argues that the role of philosophy is to understand the mind and thus the observer in order to establish what can be known.

As an empiricist, Hume discusses what we know. He divides this into two 'species' of philosophy, dealing with sensory experience, and the passions. Experience tells us about the world, and passions motivate us to act and both are required to comprehend human nature.

Hume believes that "we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into classes which are distinguished by different degrees of force and vivacity" (Enquiries: 12). Experience reaches us as atomic units of perception (e.g. greenness), which are compounded into complex impressions (e.g. apple). These in turn give rise to mental impressions (e.g. orchards). Impressions can be recorded as memories and ultimately provide the raw material for the imagination. This schema of the mind shows an increasing extrapolation from the raw perception, becoming less vivid with each step.

Having established the source of all thoughts is experience, Hume lays out his 'principles of association', the concept that all thoughts are linked. He describes resemblance (sharing a common property), contiguity (consecutive) and cause and effect as the three links between thoughts. Cause and effect describes two events that consistently appear in such a way as to lead you to believe that one leads to the other. Thus, thoughts are not random; they are derived from experience and are interlinked.

This leads to a critical understanding about Hume. Hume argues that the associations cannot be known, they are not epistemic objects, but rather a metaphysical description of how the human mind processes experience. This must be a metaphysical point, because the same concepts and associations appear in many languages, Hume argues. There is: "some universal principle, which had [sic] an equal influence on all mankind" (Enquiries: 18).

Thus Hume does not deny cause and effect, but considers it a metaphysical phenomenon we cannot know. We believe in cause and effect, but we cannot prove these things - our knowledge is too limited.

Having considered the observer, Hume constructs his epistemology. He divides knowledge into 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact'. This is termed 'Hume's Fork'. Relations of ideas are definitions or functions that are "intuitively or demonstratively certain"; for example 'Doris the spinster is an unmarried female'. The certainty of the assertion is "discoverable by the mere operation of thought" and that it is not dependent on anything existing. If one considers them not being true a logical contradiction will result. If I imagined Doris being married, but also being a spinster I have contradicted the meaning of spinster

Matters of fact however, are contingent on the universe for their truth, and so one can imagine the opposite being true without invoking a logical contradiction. If I describe my pain on putting my hand in a fire I am talking from experience. I could imagine putting my hand in a fire without experiencing pain. It might be unusual, but it contradicts no logical rules.

Hume has formed the basis for his philosophy: that experience is the source of all knowledge. He has also drawn boundaries to the human understanding and established a test for what is knowable: his fork. We can see Hume as a scientist seeking to understand what his apparatus can tell him about the world, even though in this case the apparatus is the human mind. How the human mind is constrained by its functioning relates directly to whether free will is constrained. These constraints can be seen in our use of the notion of cause and effect.

Cause and Effect

"Hume's account of causation is, rightly, the best known and most influential part of his philosophy" (Quinton). Hume's conclusions regarding causality underpin his resolution of the problem of free will. "All reasonings [sic] concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone can we go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" (Enquiries: 26).

Hume goes to great lengths to prove that we cannot know of cause and effect a priori. He states that "our reason, unassisted by experience, can never draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact" (Enquiries: 23). He argues that if the cause is to be known a priori then one of three things must be true:

1. The effect is contained in the cause
2. Cause X entails effect Y
3. There is a logical, necessary connection between X and Y

He then proceeds to demolish each point using the example of bread and the expectation that it will lead to nourishment.

1. The experience of seeing the bread and the subsequent experience of nourishment are separate events. One may tend to follow the other, but the event of nourishment is not contained within the event of observing the bread.
2. Bread does not entail nourishment. We can imagine bread that would not nourish without invoking a logical contradiction: "Reason is incapable of any such variation" (Enquiries: 36). This is Hume's fork.
3. There is no necessary connection between bread and nourishment. Aside from the criticism in (2), there is the additional issue that the future does not have to be like the past - the problem of induction.

The problem of induction is the key problem with the empirical approach to cause and effect. The issue is simple; if there is no necessary connection between cause and effect, then how can we predict the future based upon past experience? The answer is that we cannot with certainty; the future will only probably resemble the past. Despite this, human reasoning depends heavily on the assumption of a 'necessary connection' between events, so what is it that makes us think in this way?

If we are a tabula rasa, and cannot logically deduce cause and effect, then the source of our concept of cause and effect must be experience. Using Hume's schema of the mind we can see that basic perceptions arrive as a simple procession of events. As we form mental impressions we notice resemblance and contiguity between events and this is passed into memory. As our body of memory grows we notice that linked events appear 'constantly conjoined' and form a habit such that on the occurrence of one we are immediately drawn to expect the other.

Seeking to identify the source of the notion of 'necessary connection' Hume argues that it is "derived not of sensation, but of reflection" (Quinton). When a constant conjunction of events creates a customary association of ideas in the mind the imagination forms the concept of a necessary linkage.

It is at this point that Hume identifies himself as a determinist, rejecting the notion of chance and arguing that nature is ruled by cause and effect, rendering it predetermined. Crucially, we are ignorant of metaphysics, nature's 'secret powers', seeing only the effects, and not the causes. In order to be able to make sense of perception we infer a 'necessary connection' from our experience. However, if Hume is a determinist how can he reconcile this with freedom and thus preserve morality?

Detailed analysis of Hume's account of freedom

Hume believes that the only explanation for the length of time the argument concerning liberty and necessity has continued is that there must be a confusion of terms. "The whole dispute is one of words and all men have really always been agreed on the matter" (Enquiries: Selby-Bigge Introduction: 12)

First, Hume examines necessity, stating "Ideas of necessity and causation arise entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature" (Enquiries: 64). The idea of necessary connection is derived from reflection upon sensations and the consequent forming of habits.

Hume then asks why we cannot apply this method to moral philosophy as well as empirical philosophy. Firstly he points out that repeated exposure to people teaches us what actions to anticipate from which motives. "There are regularities in human nature that produce the same sort of causal inferences we make about the rest of nature" (Radcliffe: 23). Thus it seems that we apply the lessons of experience in both cases. Secondly he argues that society and the individual depend on the predictability of human nature, how else could we make laws or pursue happiness?

Hume argues that the conjunction between cause and effect is the same as that between motives and voluntary action. He declares "The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, we may change the names of things, but their nature and operation on the understanding do not change" (Enquiries: 70).

It is true, Hume acknowledges, that we feel differently about the connection between cause and effect and motive and action. However, he argues, now that we understand the experiential basis for the notion of necessity we can "ascribe necessity to the determinations of the will" (Enquiries: 71)

The central confusion, as Hume sees it, is that people feel necessity in the connection of external objects, but do not feel necessity in the voluntary actions of the mind. It is this confusion that leads directly to "a false sensation or seeming experience of liberty or indifference" (Enquiries: 72). As defined here, the necessity of an action (of matter or mind) is not a property of the cause, but exists in the thoughts of the intelligent being perceiving the action. These thoughts are required to infer the existence of that action from preceding objects and supply the feeling of necessity.

The principle of liberty requires that there be no necessity in the linkage between motives and actions. Thus, Hume argues, liberty is simply the absence of the inference that is our conception of necessity. "It is a certain looseness or indifference that is felt in the passing (or not passing) from the idea of one object to a succeeding one" (enquiries: 72).

However, as Hume has observed already, we learn from the constant conjunction of motives and actions to make these inferences. He argues that when we reflect on the previous actions of ourselves that we don't feel this "looseness". We can also commonly infer the motives of another from their actions.

Thus, it is only at the time of acting that the connection is less clear to us. As necessity means 'to take linked objects as causally connected', we therefore conclude that there is no necessity at the time of acting. We feel that our actions are subject to our will and that the will is subject to nothing.

Hence, even though we might feel liberty within ourselves, we simultaneously accept that an external observer could infer our actions from our motives. Indeed if they could not we would conclude a defect of their knowledge rather than question the link between motive and action.

Having clearly ascertained the implications of this definition of necessity, Hume goes on to question the meaning of liberty. He first identifies some meanings that do not apply:

1. there is little or no connection between action and motives and circumstances
2. one does not follow with a degree of uniformity from the other
3. there is no inference by which we can conclude the other

These points are all very significant to the problem of free will. Hume denies there is no connection between motive and action, and that the connection is not uniform and that it is not possible to infer one from the other.

Hence Hume is asserting a determined, regular connection between motive and action, in precisely the same way as he does with cause and effect. Thus all of nature, including ourselves are subject to causality.

In the same way as he argued that chance was not a 'causer' (Enquiries, Section 6), Hume then argues that liberty, rather than the opposite of a constriction (which can affect subsequent events), is merely the opposite of necessity and can thus not affect future events. Liberty itself causes nothing and so is merely the absence of a deduced connection between events. Hume defines liberty: "By liberty we mean a power of acting, or not acting, according to the determinations of the will" (Enquiries: 73). Hence we are free, but only if a "free act is defined as an act a person can do if they choose" (Radcliffe: p63)

To resolve the problem of free will, Hume considers morality. Morality requires freedom in order for personal accountability, however, Hume proposes that determinism is also a requirement. He points out the different attitudes shown to negligence versus pre-meditated actions. The whole idea of law and governance is based upon the supposition that the character motivates the action; that our actions are influenced.

If we were totally free, we could never make sense of morality nor could we if we were completely determined. However, we do make sense of morality, and thus, morality requires compatibilism, both determinism and liberty.

Hume does not attempt to logically solve the compatibility problem of determinism and free will. As an empirical philosopher the issue is solved for him, because neither can be observed in actuality. As an analytical philosopher the issue is solved as both concepts exist in a compatible fashion in the world as we find it. Essentially he has turned the debate into a dispute over definitions: "Whether we are free depends on how we define the terms" (Radcliffe: p63)

Original angle

Having offered an account of Hume's analysis of freedom, we are now in a position to look at his contribution to the problem of free will.

Before Hume, Descartes asserted that liberty was total, that we thought whatever we wanted and that mentality was not causally constrained (or even physical).

Hume bridged ancient and modern philosophy, by arguing for compatibilism, and hence accepting to a limited degree that mentality was physical. In this way, Hume's contribution was profound, paving the way for all scientific accounts of the mind, from philosophical physicalism to neuroscience.

Kant is often seen as the first of the true modern philosophers, and he credits Hume with 'awakening me from my dogmatic slumbers'. At the time, morality was at least as important as empiricism, as society struggled with the 'how to act' vacuum left by the collapse of religious authority. Both men sought to make sense of morality and hence examined freedom and necessity.

However, the fundamental difference between the two, is that Kant was a rationalist who believed in innate ideas, whilst Hume believed that we are but a blank slate. Kant wanted to ground the notion of liberty on a firmer footing than this, but acknowledging the constraints of the physical world (causality), Kant located liberty in what he termed the 'transcendental ego'

Kant essentially describes two realms in his philosophy, that of our perceptions, the subjective, epistemtic world, and the 'real' objective world that transcends our limited perception. In the case of the ego, we have a self that is physical and causally constrained, but we also have a transcendental ego that can supersede this restriction. Thus, whilst Hume sees that we extrapolate patterns from experience, Kant argues that we must have these patterns as innate ideas in order to make sense of experience in the first place.

Kant interprets the need for freedom as a need to transcend the causal. However, confronted with the same dilemma as Hume (that total freedom does not confer moral responsibility) Kant needs to set limits on this freedom. These limits are drawn by the fact that in transcending the individual, the transcendental ego links all individuals. It is fundamental to the human experience and as such we cannot simply choose for ourselves, but it is our duty to choose for all mankind "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law" (Metaphysics of Ethics). Thus, we are free to choose, but only within the framework of Kant's deontological ethics.

Both men construct a compatabilist account of necessity and freedom. Hume argues that we are free to act in accordance with our characters; the will chooses from the available actions compatible with our character. Kant also believes that we are totally free to choose, but his restriction is that we ought to act in accordance with goodwill. Goodwill is our intention to act according to our duty: to act in the best interests of the transcendental ego, which is to act as if you acted for everyone "all agents pursue their freely chosen ends to the extent compatible with a like freedom for all" (Routledge)

The fundamental differences between Kant and Hume concern sources. For Hume, the source of knowledge is experience, whereas for Kant it is only possible to make sense of experience because innate ideas provide the 'epistemic conditions' for us to know of objects in the world. This boils down to a division between the two men's metaphysics and epistemology. For Hume, cause and effect is a metaphysical phenomenon that governs the world, but remains hidden in the 'secret powers' of nature. Hence we can never know of cause and effect, we can believe in it, but cannot make it an epistemic object. For Kant the issue is the other way around, cause and effect as a metaphysical phenomenon is unknowable and hence to make sense of experience we must have innate knowledge of cause and effect.

This highlights how Hume and Kant address the same issues and come to the same conclusions, but approach from different directions. Hume's approach is to observe the world and therefore deduce how we must observe. Kant's approach is to deduce from the things that we observe the innate concepts required in order for us to observe in that way.

Both men realise that constrained freedom is required in order for morality to make sense. In order for freedom to have meaning we must weaken the link of determinism, but in order for our actions to be a reflection of ourselves, this freedom must be constrained.

Kant describes a transcendent ego that is different from the causally constrained physical ego. The transcendental ego, is essentially a universal human ego and as such our freedom as an individual is constrained by others. Hume has constructed a case whereby we freely choose from actions determined by the will. Again, in this constraint, we appear similar to such an extent that our actions are rendered predictable to others. Hume argues that there is some form of universal human nature, Kant that there is a transcendent connection between us all, but both hint at something intrinsically human and common about our experience of the world.

Although Kant argues for innate ideas and Hume argues for extrapolation from experience, both argue that something beyond our immediate sensory perception is required in order to make sense of reality. The concept of liberty, however derived, is just another one of these conditions required for us to experience the world as we do.

Conclusion

Firstly, we must acknowledge the very significant contribution of Hume to the problem of free will. His conclusions sowed the seeds of scientific investigation of the individual, from neuroscience to eliminative materialism. Hume can be seen as the first modern analytic philosopher, reviling mysticism and accepting the uncomfortable truth that individuals are physically limited and determined.

Secondly, we must acknowledge the scale of Hume's contribution to Kant's work on freedom. Kant left Hume's precepts and conclusions unchanged, but explored a different method of reaching one from the other. The enlightenment was the realisation that the method mattered more than the facts generated. Befitting this the only separation between Kant and Hume on freedom, is the method by which they reached their shared conclusions.

Bibliography
Enquiries: Enquiries concerning human understanding: oxford university press, 3rd ed
Treatise: A treatise of human nature: being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects

Secondary Texts:
Radcliffe: On Hume, Elizabeth S.Radcliffe (2000)
Quinton: Hume, Anthony Quinton (1998)
Routledge: Kant entry in Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy



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